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The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 besides creating the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, outlining its functions and bestowing
upon it essential administrative powers, affords basic safeguards for
the investor in securities.
Associate in Law, Columbia University, School of Law. A.B., Columbia University,
1966; J.D., Columbia University, 1969.
1 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1964).
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Section 10(b) of the Act is designed to curb market manipula-
tion, misrepresentation and other fraudulent practices connected with
the trading of securities.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
... to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors.2
In 1942, the SEC, pursuant to this section's authorization promulgated
rule lob-5.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any per-
son, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 3
The rule, as construed and applied by the SEC and the federal courts,
is the broadest antifraud provision in the federal securities laws.4
While almost all states have statutory proscriptions against fraudulent
practices in the trading of securities, these provisions, as applied by
state courts, are far narrower in scope than their federal counterpart. 5
Similarly, although certain types of fraudulent acts and omissions are
actionable at common law as well as under rule lOb-5, the latter serves
as a far more attractive alternative, not only because it presents a re-
2 Id. § 78j(b).
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
4See A. BRomBERO, SEcuarrrs LAws: FRAUD- SEC RuLE lOb-5, §§ 2.1-2.3 (1970)
[hereinafter A. BROMBERG].
5 The antifraud provision of the American Law Institute's uniform act, which, as of
1965, was adopted in nineteen states and Puerto Rico, is patterned very closely after rule
10b-5. UNIFORM Scuaprms Acr § 101. Unlike the general proviso of section 17 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1964), both the uniform section and the SEC
rule cover the defrauded seller as well as the defrauded purchaser of securities. However,
the uniform act places highly significant restrictions upon the recovery of compensatory
damages. UNIFom Scuarrm Acr § 410; s¢e also A, BROMBERG § 2.7.
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laxed burden of proof,6 but also because the 1934 Act provides for
nationwide process and contains extremely liberal jurisdicton and
venue requirements.7
In view of all this, it is not surprising that the use of the rule as
a litigational device is extremely widespread. Most cases brought to
challenge fraudulent practices in the trading of securities allege viola-
tion or violations of this provison.8 It should be noted, however, that
neither section 10 nor rule i0b-5 expressly provide for a right of civil
recovery. The courts, however, have consistently held that this right
must be implied.9
The earliest decision to this effect was Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co.,10 where the court, influenced not only by broad considerations of
statutory policy but also by the wording of the contract-voiding section
of the 1934 Act,"1 concluded that
a statutory enactment that a contract of a certain kind shall be
void almost necessarily implies a remedy in respect of it. The
statute would be of little value unless a party to the contract
could apply to the Courts to relieve himself of obligations under
it or to escape its consequences.12
However, the court appeared to be most heavily influenced by the basic
common-law doctrine that a person injured by acts in violation of a
statute primarily enacted to protect persons in his position is entitled
to recover, in tort, for the losses he has incurred.' 3
Once it was established that the existence of a private civil cause
0 Scienter must be proven in a common-law fraud action, whereas in most types of
lOb-5 actions, it need not be alleged or proven. See generally A. BROMBERG § 8.4.
7 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
8 A. BROMBERG § 2.5(6).
9 See L. Loss, SEcUmrIES REGULATION ch. 11C(7) (abr. ed. 1961).
10 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
11 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1964):
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this title or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, and every contract . . . heretofore or hereafter made the
performance of which involves the violation of ... any provision of this title or
any rule or regulation thereunder, shall be void .. . as regards the rights of any
person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall have
made or engaged in the performance of any such contract ....
12 69 F. Supp. at 514.
13 Id. at 513-14. In support of this proposition the court relied upon the REsrATE-
mENT or ToRTs § 286 (1934). The more recent and relaxed version of the provision which
makes it optional for "[t]he court [to] . . . adopt as the standard of conduct . . . the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation .... " R..rA'E-
MENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 286 (1965); see also McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824,
836 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961):
The basis of the Kardon doctrine was the common-law tort rule, as articulated in
Section 286 of the Restatement of Torts, that a private right of action may be
implied from a statute in favor of those whose interests the statute was desig-
nated to protect.
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of action arising out of violation of rule lOb-5 was a necessary implica-
tion, the courts set out to define the substantive scope of this provi-
sion.14 Suffice it to say that this provision has developed into the "catch-
all" of the federal securities laws, a multitentacled octopus whose arms,
often overlapping both the more specific provisions of these statutes
and the traditional doctrines of common law, now encompass virtually
any type of individual or corporate misconduct bearing on the trading
of securities.
Until recently, the attention of the courts has not focused on the
fashioning of remedies to be made available to the successful lOb-5
plaintiff. This state of affairs has been attributed to the fact that "[flew
lOb-5 cases have reached the relief stage. . . . Since far more decisions
have gone for plantiffs on the existence of a cause of action, the settle-
ment proportion has been high, but the terms are unpublished."' 5
The remainder of this paper digests and discusses court action to
date that has been concerned with the defining of civil remedies avail-
able under rule lOb-5.
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
The remarkably few lob-5 decisions that focus on the calculation
of compensatory damages to be received by a particular plaintiff mani-
fest, with exceptions, an extremely flexible approach to an extremely
difficult problem. If one has to formulate a general rule of damages
under lOb-5, it may be stated as follows:
The defrauded seller is entitled to the difference between the true
value of his stock at the time of sale and the amount he has been
paid for this stock.
The defrauded purchaser is entitled to the difference between the
amount he has paid for his stock and the true value of this stock
at the time of purchase.
These two formulae stem from the so-called out-of-pocket measure of
damages, traditionally employed in fraud cases in several states and
under the federal common law. In many lOb-5 cases, however, strict
application of this rule will not effectuate restoration of the status quo
ante which the award of compensatory damages is generally intended
14 This phase of the development of the case law under lOb-5 is beyond the scope of
this article, and has been subject to continuous law review treatment. See, e.g., Bloomen-
thal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and Self-Aggrandizement, 15
N.Y.LF. 332 (1969); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for
Rule lob-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968); Note, "Federal Corporation Law" and 10b-5: The
Case for Codification, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 274 (1970).
15 A. BROmmERG § 9.1.
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to accomplish. This failure is almost always attributable to the out-of-
pocket rule's failure to take fluctuations in the value of securities after
the time of purchase or sale into account. In the ensuing discussion,
we will see how a number of courts have deviated from the strict appli-
cation of the rule in order to arrive at highly realistic evaluations of
compensatory damages specially designed to do justice in particular
cases.
16
Recovery By The Defrauded Seller
(1) Material Nondisclosure and Misrepresentation - Considering
Accretions in Market Value Subsequent to Tainted Transaction
The defrauded seller is typically the victim of unlawful nondis-
closures or material misrepresentations that cause him to part with his
stock at an artificially depressed price. To fully compensate him, a court
usually must take into account subsequent accretions in the value of
the securities thus transferred.
In Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 17 one of the many share-
holder suits filed as an outgrowth of the landmark case of SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.,18 plaintiffs alleged that they were induced to sell
their shares by the unlawful withholding of material inside informa-
tion by company personnel. On April 12, 1964, Texas Gulf, in the
midst of rumors that it had made a major mineral strike in Canada,
issued a press release greatly minimizing the importance of its reported
findings. Four days later, it issued another release to announce a strike
of staggering proportions. Of the three plaintiffs that had prevailed on
the merits, two had sold their shares just after issuance of the inten-
tionally misleading first release. The third had sold his shares just after
publication of the second release, confused and disturbed by the fact
that it directly contradicted the terms of the first.
In evaluating damages, the court reasoned that plaintiffs had to
be permitted a reasonable time in which to discover the fraud com-
16 Not every court has shown this flexibility. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F.
Supp. 808 (EI). Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963), where the court, after
finding for the defendant on the merits, remarked:
"Actual damages" are to be computed under the federal "out of pocket" rule
applied in fraud actions, i.e., the difference between the price received by the
plaintiff and the real or actual value of the stock at the date of the sale. Under
this rule, a plaintiff is entitled to recover what he has lost by the sale but may
not recover any actual or potential gain that was received by the defendants.
Id. at 825 (emphasis added).
17 309 F. Supp. 548 (C.D. Utah 1970).
18 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see generally Note,
Texas Gulf Sulphur: Expanding Concepts of Corporate Disclosure Under SEC Rule 10b.5,
43 ST. JoHN's L. R y. 655, 685 (1969).
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plained of and replace their stock, through purchase on the open
market, if they so desired.
The variety of situations in which a 10(b) or lOb-5 violation may
be found makes it difficult to formulate a comprehensive rule of
damages .... It seems to this court that the true and just measure
of damages in these cases should be, with some qualification, what
long ago came to be called the New York Rule. Of necessity, it was
unthinkable that the common-law rule in trover for the conversion
of ordinary chattels, i.e., fair market value at time of conversion
should be applied in the case of corporate shares with rapidly
changing values. So the rule evolved that the measure of damages
in stock transactions is the highest intermediate value reached by
the stock between the time of the wrongful act complained of and
a reasonable time after the injured party received, or should have
received notice of it, a time within which he has a reasonable op-
portunity to replace the stock.19
Furthermore, the court concluded that a few days was not sufficient for
a duly diligent seller to discover the type of fraud complained of, nor
for the New York market to reflect the true value of the Texas Gulf
shares they had sold. Instead, the average of the highest daily market
price of these shares over a period of twenty trading days immediately
after issuance of the April 16th release announcing the major strike
minus the per share price received by plaintiffs, multiplied by the num-
ber of shares sold by each of the plantiffs was the formula adopted by
the court to calculate their respective damages.
Where, as in Reynolds, the defrauded seller is deprived of profits
that are a reflection of a major piece of good news concerning the cor-
poration's operations, it is logical for the court to consider upward
fluctuations in the market value of the securities sold that reflect full
disclosure of this information to the investing public. 20 Where insider
nondisclosures and misrepresentations are of a far broader type, de-
priving the defrauded seller of information concerning the corpora-
tion's overall greatly improved business outlook and growth potential,
the courts are sometimes willing to look far beyond relatively imme-
diate accretions in a stock's value in calculating damages.
19 309 F. Supp. at 562-63. As justification for this liberal approach, the court relied
on the RESTATEmENT OF RESTIr=ON:
Where the subject matter is of fluctuating value, and where the person deprived
of it might have secured a higher amount for it had he not been so deprived,justice to him may require that the measure of recovery be more than the value
at the time of deprivation.
R ErATEMENT OF RFSTITUTION § 151, comment c (1937).
20 The Kohler case provides a good discussion of the difficulties presented when a
stock has no ascertainable market value on which to base an evaluation of damages. See
208 F. Supp. at 811-16.
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For instance, in the recent Eighth Circuit case of Myzel v. Fields,21
defendant insiders purchased stock from the various plaintiffs on the
basis of misrepresentations and nondisclosure of their corporation's
significantly improved sales and profits picture. As the stock in ques-
tion was not publicly traded, the market value of the shares sold was
not readily ascertainable. The Court of Appeals, reasoning that plain-
tiffs were entitled to full restoration of the status quo ante, approved
the following jury charge issued by the trial court on the question of
damages:
1. At the very least, plaintiffs should recover "out of pocket" dam-
ages- the difference between the actual value of their shares
at the time of sale and the purchase price.
2. If plaintiffs, upon full disclosure, would have demanded and
received a higher price for their shares, they should recover the
difference between this higher price and the actual purchase
price.
3. If plaintiffs, upon full disclosure, would have refused to sell
their shares, the jury could consider not only the true value of
their shares at the time of sale, taking into account the corpora-
don's subsequent prosperity, but also actual "subsequent in-
creases in the value of the stock over.., a reasonable period,"
at the end of which, presumably, plaintiffs would have sold
their shares even had they not been approached by defendants.
Recovery would then be calculated as the difference between
this higher price and the actual purchase price.22
Especially significant about this extremely flexible approach in calcu-
lating damages is that it is left for the jury to surmise what each seller's
probable actions in selling or retaining his stock would have been but
for the nondisclosures and misrepresentations complained of. Despite
this possible shortcoming, however, the prospects for plaintiffs receiv-
ing equitable treatment were far better than had the jury been re-
quired to stick to a strict out-of-pocket method of evaluating damages.
(2) Material Nondisclosure and Misrepresentation - The "What
Might Have Been" Approach - "Windfalls" to Defrauded Sell-
ers
The case of Speed v. Transamerica Gorp. is an even stronger in-
dication of a court's willingness to speculate on what would have been
the probable investment action taken by defrauded sellers but for the
fraudulent omissions and misrepresentations that induced them to part
213 86 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
22 Id. at 744-45.
23 185 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), modified, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
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with their stock. Plaintiffs were minority shareholders in a subsidiary
of the defendant corporation who sold their shares pursuant to a writ-
ten offer which grossly underestimated the value of the subsidiary's
inventory and gave a misleading gloomy sales and profits picture.
Ascribed to the parent-defendant corporation was an undisclosed
scheme to liquidate its subsidiary and realize the greatly increased and
as yet unpublicized true value of its tobacco inventory.
The court found that defendants had violated lOb-5 and, in so
doing, had breached their fiduciary obligations owed by them as major-
ity shareholders to the plaintiffs, who were former Class A and Class B
shareholders in the subsidiary. The court proceeded to reconstruct
both the challenged sales and the subsequent liquidation. First, the
court reasoned that Class A and Class B shareholders should be treated
the same, since the former, as victims of an illegal call surrounded by
material nondisclosures, had been deprived of participation in the
liquidation and would undoubtedly have elected to convert their
shares on a one-to-one basis for Class B stock, an alternate option given
to those not interested in taking advantage of the call. Next, the court
rejected defendants' contention that Class B shareholders were not en-
titled to damages in excess of the difference between the market value
of their shares and the consideration received:
[oin a "what might have been" or a "reconstructed liquidation," as-
suming a valid call and full disclosure of facts as to values, all stock
owned or formerly owned by plaintiffs shall be considered as "B"
stock. All stock owned by defendant shall be also so considered. All
shares of plaintiffs and those acquired by defendant shall be
divided into the value of the assets at the time of liquidation. This
is the rule of recovery.24
The "what might have been" approach taken by Chief Judge
Leahy in Speed has, on occasion, produced a windfall for the defrauded
seller that could not have been entirely anticipated by even a fully
informed shareholder at the time of sale. In Janigan v. Taylor,25 de-
frauded sellers brought a class action challenging their sale to the pres-
ident of their corporation of virtually all of the company's outstanding
stock for $40,000. The court found that defendant, on the day of sale
at a directors' meeting, had consciously and falsely represented that the
condition of the company had not materially changed in past months,
when in fact its future profits picture had greatly improved. Two
years later, defendant sold these shares for $700,000. The First Circuit
24 Id. at 194.
25 344 F.2d 781 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
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held that plaintiffs were entitled to defendant's profit, in essence creat-
ing a constructive trust to cover the two-year period between the chal-
lenged purchase and subsequent resale. After indicating that defrauded
purchasers are not generally entitled to more than "the difference be-
tween the real value of the property at the date of its sale . . . and
the price paid for it," the court continued:
On the other hand, if the property is not bought from, but sold to
the fraudulent party, future accretions not foreseeable at the time
of the transfer even on the true facts, and hence speculative, are
subject to another factor, viz., that they accrued to the fraudulent
party. It may, as in the case at bar, be entirely speculative whether,
had plaintiffs not sold, the series of fortunate occurrences would
have happened in the same way, and to their same profit. However,
there can be no speculation but that the defendant actually made
the profit and, once it found that he acquired the property by
fraud, that the profit was the proximate consequence of the fraud,
whether foreseeable or not. It is more appropriate to give the de-
frauded party the benefit of windfalls than to let the fraudulent
party keep them.26
(3) Material Nondisclosure and Misrepresentation - Recovery of
Defrauding Purchaser's Profits on Resale Contemplated at Time
of Tainted Transaction
Where, unlike in Janigan, the defrauding purchaser enjoys the
profits from a relatively immediate resale contemplated at the time of
the challenged purchase, the defrauded seller stands an even better
chance of recovering these profits as his damages because the resale
price may be deemed the true value of the shares at the time of the
challenged purchase, thus negating the inference that an award of an
undeserved "windfall" has been made.
Hence, in Kardon, two shareholders that had sold a combined half
interest in a close corporation to its two remaining shareholders al-
leged that, at the time of sale, the defendants had already arranged for
the sale of the corporation at a substantial profit without disclosing
these plans. The court found for plaintiffs, with the proper remedial
relief in this situation consisting of "an accounting to ascertain and
restore to the plaintiffs their proportionate share of the profits, if
any. 27
The Kardon approach was followed recently in Ross v. Licht,28 a
suit by defrauded sellers against corporate insiders to whom they had
26 Id. at 786.
27 73 F. Supp. 798, 801-02 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
28 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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sold their stock for $120 per share. Subsequently they learned that de-
fendants had undisclosed information at the time of the challenged
transactions, of purchase proposals set at a minimum of $300 per share.
The court reasoned that plaintiffs were entitled to damages based on
the "fair value" of their shares at the time of sale. It further reasoned
that, particularly where no market value could be established for these
shares at the time of the challenged transactions, this "true value" had
to be calculated on the basis of circumstances existing for a reasonable
time prior to and subsequent to the sale. The court, using a $300 "true
value" figure equal to the purchase price of these shares in a private
placement that took place two weeks after the fraudulent purchases,
awarded damages of $180 per share.2 9
(4) Private Placement Price as a Measure of "True Value"
While the court in Ross was willing to accept a private placement
resale price as a measure of "true value" in its calculation of damages,
there is firm indication in Pappas v. Moss,30 that a court will not auto-
matically accept a private placement price as such a measure, particu-
larly if the facts suggest unlawful self-dealing by corporate officers. In
Pappas, shareholders brought a derivative action on behalf of the seller-
corporation against its officers and directors to challenge the private
placement of its shares at $6 each, while public trading was at approxi-
mately $13 per share. Defendants had actively participated in the place-
ment, fraudulently claiming that interested outside investors had in-
sisted on their doing so.
In its assessment of damages, the court permitted a "reasonable
discount" of 20 percent, once convinced that a genuine need for a
placement had existed, stating:
The expert testimony set forth a wide range of permissive discount
which, under the facts here, is neither very helpful nor highly
persuasive. I have concluded that a reasonable discount, under all
the facts and circumstances of this case, was 20%. The measure of
damages is the difference between the total price paid at 20% dis-
count of the average market price on the date of the respective pur-
chases.31
29 Interestingly enough, shortly after the challenged purchases, the shares involved
in Ross had become almost worthless. The court relied upon this factor in its denial of
prejudgment interest. id. at 411-12.
30 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966), rev'd and remanded, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968).
The reversal was necessary for a reconsideration of the common-law court and darifica-
tion of the measure of damages.
31 Id. at 364.
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Recovery By The Defrauded Purchaser
(1) Material Nondisclosure and Misrepresentation - Considering
Decreases in Market Value Subsequent to Tainted Transaction
Typically, a successful lOb-5 plaintiff-purchaser has been fraudu-
lently induced into acquiring stock that has subsequently declined in
value. In these circumstances, plaintiff will ordinarily seek to rescind
the sale in order to recover his purchase price upon restoration of the
stock to the defrauding seller.3 2
The defrauded purchaser will not seek rescission if, for any reason,
he desires to retain the securities he has acquired. A sharp decline in
the value of the consideration paid by the purchaser may also cause
him to elect to affirm the challenged transaction and sue for damages.
Finally, the purchaser will have to seek damages if, for any reason,
rescission is unavailable to him.
Digression from strict application of the out-of-pocket measure of
damages is less frequently called for in defrauded purchaser cases than
in defrauded seller cases. Generally, only when a seller is defrauded,
does the defendant retain the securities transferred pursuant to the
challenged transaction, sometimes reaping a profit that the court orders
paid over to the seller on some sort of constructive trust basis. Never-
theless, the courts, where necessary, have shown considerable flexibility
in setting a defrauded purchaser's damages.
In Esplin v. Hirschi,33 an award of damages to a defrauded pur-
chaser was affirmed despite the fact that the trial jury had found that
the stock in question, at the time of the challenge sale, was valued at
the price plaintiff had paid for it. Refusing strict application of the
out-of-pocket rule, which would have precluded an award of damages,
the court reasoned that a plaintiff should recover an amount equal to
the subsequent decrease in the value of the stock purchased, especially
when the decrease is due to material factors not adequately disclosed
at the time of sale. The Esplin holding may alternately be stated as
follows: The defrauded purchaser, where stock he acquires declines
in value, may recover the difference between the purchase price and the
value of his stock at the time seller's fraud is, or should, with due dili-
gence, be discovered 34
32 E.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 574 (10th Cir. 1965); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284
F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960). See discussion of rescission commencing at 751 infra.
33 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968).
34 As might be expected, the defrauded purchaser, as well as the defrauded seller,
may generally recover outlays incidental to the challenged transaction. See, e.g., Sackett v.
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(2) Material Nondisclosure and Misrepresentation - The "What
Might Have Been" Approach
Gottlieb v. Sandia American Corp.35 again illustrates the willing-
ness of a court to consider downward fluctuations in the value of shares
received by a defrauded purchaser in evaluating his damages. In this
recent case, ex-shareholders of the World Wide Bowling Corporation
brought suit to challenge their company's acquisition by Sandia, con-
tending that the underlying exchange of stock and debentures had
been induced by the latter's fraudulent omissions and misrepresenta-
tions. The court, after finding that rescission was unavailable because
of "the acts of the defendants in spinning off and subsequently relin-
quishing their ownership interest in the former World Wide assets,"36
set out to evaluate the damages to which plaintiffs were entitled.
First, the court rejected strict application of the out-of-pocket rule
as both impractical- it would be extremely difficult to evaluate the
value of either World Wide or Sandia securities at the time of the
exchange - and unfair to plaintiffs - the Sandia securities received
by them had declined sharply in value following the exchange and were
virtually untradeable, leaving no practical means of unloading the
newly acquired stock upon discovery of the fraud.
An application of the so-called "rescission measure of damages"
was ruled out since such a measurement, being equal to the "present
market value of the consideration received," would have put the bur-
den of subsequent decreases in the value of Sandia stock squarely on
the defendants. The court reasoned that this measure of damages
would call for equally speculative evaluations and that, in any event,
its application was far more suited to a case involving a defrauding
purchaser as defendant - one who has received "an unexpected or
unwarranted windfall" due to accretions in the worth of securities
fraudulently acquired by him.
Finally, after pointing to the fact that "strict application of the
remedies previously considered was rendered difficult or impracticable
Beaman, 399 F.2d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1968), discussed at note 74 and accompanying text
infra. Similarly, amounts realized by the purchaser on his stock are sometimes deducted
from his damages where subsequent decreases in the value of his stock are taken into
account. For example, in Esplin, the court subtracted dividends received by plaintiff from
his award. In many cases, an appropriate item of relief is prejudgment interest on the
damages incurred, which the court, in its discretion, may award. Such relief is usually
denied if it will work an extreme hardship upon the defendant. See, e.g., Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
85 304 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
36 Id. at 990.
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by the fraudulent conduct of the defendants,"37 the court decided to
create its own hybrid remedy to deal with the unusual set of facts and
circumstances before it. Plaintiffs would restore to defendants those
Sandia securities, now greatly reduced in value, received by them pur-
suant to the challenged exchange. In return, plaintiffs would receive
from defendants, with interest, a pro rata share of the monetary equiv-
alent of all World Wide securities transferred to Sandia; the value of
these securities to be determined, insofar as practicable, as of the time
of the exchange. In effect, the court had ordered a quasi-rescission of
the challenged transaction, with restitution to be made through cash
payment. Justifying its decree on a "what would have been" basis, an
approach used in some of the defrauded seller cases previously dis-
cussed, the court concluded:
Regardless of how this adjustment is formally characterized, we
think it will as effectively as is now possible restore the parties to
the position they would have been in had there been no fraud in
the first place: The plaintiffs will have the monetary equivalent
of their bowling business as if they had sold it for a fair price at
the time of the exchange ... with fair interest to the present. The
defendants on the other hand will have the stock which they gave
to the plaintiffs in connection with the transaction so that they will
be treated as if World Wide had known all of the facts and re-
jected the Sandia offer.38
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Cases
(1) The Majority Rule
The great weight of case authority points against the award of
punitive damages in lOb-5 suits. Indeed, the language of the Securities
Exchange Act lends itself to this interpretation.
The rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in addition
to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or
in equity; but no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages
under the provisions of this title shall recover, through satisfaction
of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of
actual damages on account of the act complained of.39
It is on the basis of this "actual damages" provision, which, when
broadly construed, outlaws the recovery of exemplary damages in suits
brought under the 1934 Act, that several courts have held that such
37 Id. at 991.
38 Id. at 991-92.
39 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
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damages are not available to the successful lOb-5 plaintiff. The Second
Circuit placed great reliance on section 28(a) in its recent decision in
Green v. Wolf Corp.40 In this case, the plaintiffs appealed the striking
of that portion of their class action complaint that requested punitive
damages for defendants' alleged violation of rule lOb-5. In approving
this action by the district court, the Second Circuit summarized and
refuted the three basic arguments customarily set forth in favor of the
award of punitive damages in lOb-5 suits.
First, to the argument that section 28(a) was solely intended to
prevent multiple recoveries through the bringing of both federal and
state suits based on the same alleged fraudulent conduct,41 the court
responded that such a limited construction was not warranted when
the Exchange Act was read so as to effectuate its broad purposes. The
vagueness of this response was attributed to the absence of any mean-
ingful legislative history surrounding the section's adoption.42
Second, to the argument that the right to civil recovery under
lOb-5 is implied on the basis of a common-law statutory-tort theory and
that such an action is not "a suit for damages under the provisions of
this [Act]" as contemplated by section 28(a), the court somewhat in-
directly responded: "We have gone far beyond the limits of the com-
mon law in imposing liability under lOb-5 and thus may not import
all the other aspects of common law fraud without scrutiny. '43
Third, to the argument that punitive damages are permitted under
the Securities Act of 193344 and that the 1934 Act should be read in
pari materia, the court noted that the fact that the 1933 Act does not
contain language similar to that in section 28(a) shows that "Congress
might well have intended to impose different liabilities under each of
the two Acts," perhaps so as to encourage registration under the 1934
Act by having it carry lighter penalties.45 Interestingly enough, the
Second Circuit, shortly after deciding Green, held in Globus v. Law
Research Service, Inc.46 that a district court award of punitive damages
under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act 47 was also improper.
40 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
41 See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 444 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
42 406 F.2d at 302-03.
43 Id. at 303.
44 Cf. Nagel v. Prescott & Co., 36 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (denial of a motion
to strike interrogatories as rejection of contention that punitive damages are not available
under the 1933 Act).
45 406 F.2d at 803.
46 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 897 U.S. 913 (1970).
47 15 US.C. § 77g(a) (1964). This section is the most general anti-fraud provision in
the Act.
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There are several other decisions which are in accord with Green,
denying recovery of punitive damages in a successful lOb-5 suit. The
Eighth Circuit, in the Myzel case held, with little discussion, that the
recovery of such damages is precluded by the aforedescribed "actual
damages" restriction contained in section 28(a) of the 1934 Act. Finally,
still on the appellate level, the Second Circuit, in Globus, reaffirmed
its position in Green, holding that section 28(a) effectively precluded
the recovery of punitive damages in lOb-5 suits. 48
(2) The Minority Rule
A few recent district court cases, decided in the face of consider-
able contrary precedent, either hold or indicate in dictum that puni-
tive damages may be awarded in a rule lOb-5 action. In de Haas v.
Empire Petroleum Co.,49 defendants sought to vacate a punitive jury
award of $5000 based upon a violation of lOb-5. The district court
upheld this award, holding that such damages "are allowable . . .
where aggravated scienter is clearly shown by the facts."50
The court expressly refused to follow the contrary holding in
Green, reasoning that the section 28(a) "actual damages" limitation
applied "only to claims which are expressly or impliedly created by the
Act itself."'5; Furthermore, lOb-5 claims are grounded purely in tort
law and, accordingly, fall outside this category. Because some element
of scienter is needed to make out a rule lob-5 violation, such a viola-
tion could be likened to "the commission of an intentional tort from
which punitive damages flow depending on the circumstances. 5 2
While the de Haas award of punitive damages was recently over-
turned by the Tenth Circuit, dicta may be found in other district court
decisions that support its initial holding. Despite this reversal of the
one lOb-5 case in which punitive damages were actually awarded, these
dicta suggest policy considerations that may ultimately serve as bases
for judicially carved out exceptions to what must now be accepted as
the prevailing rule that punitive damages are not available in a lOb-5
action.
48 Several district court cases also bar the recovery of exemplary damages in lOb-5
actions. See, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345, 364 (D.N.J. 1966), rev'd and remanded,
393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955); see also Reynolds v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548, 564 (C.D. Utah 1970); Klein v. Spear, 306 F. Supp.
743, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
49 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969), rev'd, CCH Fan. SEc. L. REP. 92, 898 (10th Cir.
Dec. 22, 1970).
50 Id. at 649.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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The de Haas lower court opinion cites with approval Hecht v.
Harris, Upham 8 Co.,53 which states that punitive damages may be
awarded in an appropriate lOb-5 case. In Hecht, however, the court
refused to award such damages as a matter of discretion. Two factors
influenced this choice. First, the court, in its discretion, had already
awarded substantial prejudgment interest to the plaintiff. Second, de-
fendants, as a result of their misconduct, faced NASD disciplinary
proceedings.
Finally, in Stevens v. Abbott,54 the court, while denying punitive
damages under a lob-5 claim, likewise treated the question of their
availability as a matter of discretion.55 Citing Hecht, the court based
its denial of exemplary damages on two factors. First, plaintiff had re-
ceived adequate compensatory damages and should not be "unduly
enriched." Second, judging from defendants' "prior impeccable repu-
tation," such an award was not needed to deter similar future conduct
on their part.
Surrounding Policy Considerations
The decision by the great majority of the courts not to award
punitive damages in lob-5 cases is basically a sound one.56 A combina-
tion of policy and practical considerations, not wholly set forth by the
courts in their opinions, may be advanced in support of this position:
(1) As the Second Circuit argued in Green, an award of punitive
damages against the typical corporate defendant will lead to inequities
insofar as "the heavy burden would ultimately fall on all the stock-
holders, including mere innocent pawns. '5 7 In de Haas, the one lob-5
case in which exemplary damages were actually awarded by a district
court, both an individual and corporate defendant were named. It is
interesting to note that the court in this case awarded these damages
only against the individual defendant.5 8
(2) Punitive damages are sometimes awarded to fully compensate
the plaintiff who has suffered serious injury not susceptible of mone-
tary evaluation. The typical lOb-5 plaintiff, upon prevailing on the
merits, is in a position to establish his monetary losses. As a result,
53 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
5i 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
55 Id. at 848.
565 The availability of punitive damages under IOb-5 has been the subject of consider-
able discussion in the past year. The subject has been treated in: Note, Punitive Damages
as a Remedy for a Violation of Rule lOb-5, 55 CoPNELL L. REv. 646 (1970).
57 406 F.2d at 303.
58 302 F. Supp. at 648; see also the Globus case, 418 F.2d at 1286 n.10,
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10b-5 recoveries tend to be quite high.59 It can further be argued from
this that punitive damages are not needed in the lOb-5 area either as
an incentive to wronged investors to bring suit or as an added deter-
rent to those who would violate its proscriptions. Frequently, plaintiffs
may share ordinarily burdensome litigation expenses by bringing a
class action.
(3) Rule lOb-5 suits are generally multi-plaintiff proceedings which
often lead to a multiplicity of subsequent related suits. Permitting
each plaintiff, in each suit, to recover punitive damages from the same
defendant or group of defendants would lead to liability far beyond
the degree of fault, this, on the unlikely assumption that the defendant
or defendants would be able to pay such vast amounts.
(4) Punitive damages are traditionally awarded only against defen-
dants guilty of intentional and malicious misconduct. Often, miscon-
duct adjudged to be a lOb-5 violation is not of this type.A0 Where
defendants alleged misconduct does manifest the type of "aggravated
scienter" on which the court in de Haas predicated its award of puni-
tive damages, 61 it will fall within the more restricted traditional boun-
daries of common-law fraud. If the conduct of defendant on which a
common-law fraud cause of action may be predicated brings him
within the jurisdiction of a state whose courts do award punitive dam-
ages to the victims of intentionally fraudulent misconduct, plaintiff
should follow the litigation strategy outlined immediately below.
Joinder of Common-Law Fraud and Rule 10b-5 Claims
Recovery of Punitive Damages
Under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as set forth in the
landmark Supreme Court case of Hum v. Oursler,2 a federal court
entertaining a bona fide federal claim will usually also assume jurisdic-
tion of all related state law claims arising out of the same transaction
or series of transactions on which the federal claim is predicated.
Hence, it is a fairly common practice, when bringing suit under rule
10b-5, to include in the complaint claims under state law for fraud and
deceit grounded on the same basic factual allegations set forth in sup-
port of the federal claim. If plaintiff succeeds in proving these com-
mon-law claims, he may also succeed in recovering punitive damages.
59 Id.
6D See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); see generally 82 HARv. L. REv.
951, 957 (1969).
61 302 F. Supp. at 649.
62 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
1971]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In Gann v. Bernzomatic Corp.,63 defendants moved to strike from
plaintiffs' prayer for relief their request for punitive damages. The
complaint set forth both a lOb-5 claim and related common-law claims.
In denying this motion, the court reasoned:
Assuming that [punitive damages may not be recovered in an ac-
tion under the Exchange Act], defendants overlook the fact that
. . . the present amended complaint states a claim under state
law for fraud and deceit, a claim of which this court has pendent
jurisdiction. If plaintiffs establish their claim, they may be entitled
to punitive damages under New York Law .... 64
This approach was followed by the district court in Globus v. Law
Research Service, Inc.,6 5 a shareholders' action asserting violations of
both section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
These claims were joined with a common-law fraud count alleging vio-
lation of New York law. In consideration of the question of whether
resort to relief under the Exchange Act precludes recovery of all but
actual damages, the court noted that "[w]hile the contention is an
interesting one, defendants' position cannot succeed because it over-
looks the first clause of section 28(a) ..... 6 6 The court's recognition of
the non-exclusive remedial nature of the Exchange Act provision per-
mitted the following conclusion: "Among the other remedies available
to . . .plaintiffs is a common law deceit action . . .with [its] possi-
bilit[y ]of punitive damages."6' 7
In both Gann and Globus, the courts indicate, at least indirectly
through cross-reference to state decisions, that they will follow state
law not only in passing up on the legal sufficiency of the common-law
fraud count joined to a claim or claims under the federal securities
law, but also in determining whether punitive damages should be
awarded pursuant to this count.65
63 262 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
64 Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
65 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the
Southern District's determination that punitive damages are available under section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act. Because the jury found defendants not liable on the common-law fraud
count, the Second Circuit did not pass on the district court's holding that section 28(a)
does not prohibit recovery of punitive damages in an action for common-law fraud joined
to an action based on the 1934 Act.
66 287 F. Supp. at 196.
67 Id.
68 Both decisions cite Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d
488, (1961), which held that recovery of punitive damages may be had in a fraud case
only when the alleged misconduct is part of a scheme to defraud the public generally
rather than solely a particular plaintiff. This New York "public injury" requirement
was incorporated in the trial judge's jury charge in Globus: "The test is whether there
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RESCISSION
In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,6 9 a section 14 case involving a stock-
holder challenge to a consummated merger allegedly effected through
the use of false and misleading proxy materials, the United States
Supreme Court dealt specifically with the availability of rescission as a
remedy under the Exchange Act, stating that
[i]t is for the federal courts "to adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief" where federally secured rights are invaded
.... Section 27 (of the Exchange Act) grants the District Courtsjurisdiction "of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this title . .." In passing
on almost identical language found in the Securities Act of 1933,
the Court found the words entirely sufficient to fashion a remedy
to rescind a fraudulent sale, secure restitution and even to enforce
the right to restitution against a third party holding assets of the
vendor.70
Language found in section 29(b) of the Exchange Act to the effect
that "[e]very contract made in violation of any provision of this title
or of any rule or regulation thereunder... shall be void" may well be
the ultimate justification for awarding rescission of stock transactions
materially tainted by violation of rule lOb-5. The courts, however,
have not construed these words as a statutory mandate, but rather as a
basis for rendering such transactions voidable at the option of the
innocent parties thereto under appropriate circumstances. 71 The award
of rescission in an Exchange Act case, as at common law, is purely
within the discretion of the trial court. The request for rescission in
an Exchange Act case is subject to the traditional equitable defenses of
waiver, laches and estoppel.7 2
Basic Investor Transactions
In the straightforward cash or stock transaction, a defrauded seller
or purchaser will normally seek compensatory damages under lOb-5
is high moral culpability or such gross fraud and deceit upon the public .... " 287 F.
Supp. at 193 (emphasis added). See also Dupont Galleries, Inc. v. International Magne-
Tape, Ltd., 300 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); holding that, in a common-law fraud
action, a federal court must follow applicable state law to determine the availability of
punitive damages. Under New York law, such damages are not available in an ordinary
fraud case. Accordingly, suit must be dismissed for failure to meet the "amount in
controversy" standard required for federal diversity jurisdiction.
69 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
70 Id. at 433, citing Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) (em-
phasis added).
71 See, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962),
aff'd on remand, 333 F.2d 568 (1964).
72 Id; see also Walpert v. Bart, 280 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Md. 1967).
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rather than equitable relief. An award of such damages, particularly
where measured so as to take into account fluctuations in market value
after the challenged purchase or sale, generally serves as the simplest
way of restoring the status quo ante. Nevertheless, ample case author-
ity exists for the proposition that the defrauded seller or purchaser
may, at his option, seek rescission in lieu of such damages.
(1) The Defrauded Purchaser
It is generally recognized that a defrauded purchaser seeking re-
lief under lOb-5 may, upon discovery of the fraud or misrepresentation
complained of, either choose to affirm the transaction and sue for dam-
ages or seek to cancel the contract of sale so as to recover the purchase
price upon restoration of the securities acquired in the tainted trans-
action. The Ninth Circuit in Sackett v. Beaman73 recently stated that a
defrauded purchaser can request either "cancellation of the contract
of sale" or "damages under what may be called an out-of-pocket rule,
namely, the difference between the real value of the property pur-
chased at the date of its sale ... and the price paid for it, together with
interest and associated outlays by the purchaser." 74
A grant of rescission to a defrauded purchaser will lead to his re-
covery of whatever consideration he has paid for his stock less any
dividends or capital distributions received by him during his period of
ownership.75
Where securities purchased in a tainted transaction are worthless
at the time of sale, the recovery of damages and the award of rescission
will produce identical results- recovery of the full purchase price by
the defrauded purchaser. 76 Where, however, securities so purchased do
not become worthless until after the time of sale, it will be to the ad-
vantage of the defrauded purchaser, particularly when bringing suit in
a jurisdiction applying a strict out-of-pocket measure of damages, to
seek rescission rather than monetary relief. However, the defrauded
purchaser that waits for a long period of time after discovery of the
fraud before seeking rescission may be precluded by certain equitable
defenses from gaining the relief he seeks.77
In Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith,78 another Ninth Circuit
73 399 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1968).
74 Id. at 891; see also Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968).
75 See, e.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d at 105; Stephens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th
Cir. 1965).
76 See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960).
77 See Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
303 F.2d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1962), discussed at note 93 and accompanying text infra.
78 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
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case, a defrauded purchaser sought to recover his full $50,000 invest-
ment in a real estate corporation that had been liquidated before he
brought suit. The trial court refused to consider the equitable defenses
of laches and estoppel interposed by defendants in response to the
purchaser's request for rescission. The Ninth Circuit remanded the
case, stating:
Since the buyer can elect to retain his investment, we see no reason
why he can not waive his statutory right to rescind or be estopped
from asserting such right .... The purpose of the Securities
Exchange Act is to protect the innocent investor, not one who
loses his innocence and then waits to see how his investment turns
out before he decides to invoke the provisions of the Act79
The court's conclusion that laches and the related equitable defenses
of waiver and estoppel apply to a request for rescission in a lOb-5 suit
was largely inferred from the non-existence of an applicable federal
statute of limitations. On remand, the trial court disallowed the equi-
table defenses pleaded by defendant, after giving full consideration to
their applicability to the facts of the case.80
(2) The Defrauded Seller
Rescission is also available to the defrauded seller in a lOb-5
suit. In Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chemical Corp.,8 ' an action by the
trustee of a debtor corporation in reorganization to rescind the sale to
defendant of all the corporation's stock in its formerly totally owned
subsidiary, the court held that rescission would be awarded upon
plaintiff's showing that restoration or an offer to restore the considera-
tion received had been made. A similar result was reached in Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 2 involving defrauded sellers who had transferred all the
stock in their family-owned corporation in exchange for stock in the
BarChris Corporation. The court awarded plaintiffs $100,000 in dam-
ages, the amount paid by them prior to the judgment to BarChris'
bankruptcy trustee to regain their stock.
Just as it will be to the very possible advantage of the defrauded
purchaser to seek rescission rather than damages when the stock he
holds has decreased in value, converse logic dictates that it will be to
the advantage of the defrauded seller to seek rescission in lieu of dam-
79 Id. at 213-14.
80 The award to the plaintiff of his full purchase price was subsequently affirmed by
the Ninth Circuit. 333 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964).
81 244 F. Supp. 267 (D. Colo. 1965).
82 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. lPU. 92,826 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9,
1970).
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ages when the stock he has parted with has increased in value, as is
often the case. While several courts have permitted the defrauded
seller to recover this increased value in damages on a constructive trust
approach, s3 others have refused to apply anything other than a strict
out-of-pocket measure.84 Certainly, in these out-of-pocket jurisdictions,
the defrauded purchaser should seek rescission, remaining conscious
of the fact that an undue delay after discovery of the fraud in request-
ing this relief may lead to the successful interposition of equitable
defenses by the defendant.
Corporate Combinations
Many transfers of stock take place in the context of corporate
combinations -mergers and consolidations. In these situations, par-
ticularly where the defrauded party is a seller of securities who has
acquired grossly overevaluated corporate assets in return, the award
of monetary damages may well prove to be an inadequate form of re-
lief. Often, this inadequacy will be attributable to either the inability
of the defrauding purchaser to pay a large amount of damages or the
unwillingness of the defrauded seller to be saddled with a floundering
corporate acquisition.
While, as previously noted, not too many 1Ob-5 cases have reached
the relief stage in litigation, there are several in which rescission of a
merger or consolidation has been sought.8 5 In only a few of these cases
does the court actually award rescission or indicate a firm willingness
to do so.
For example, in the Lanza case, the Southern District Court in
New York held that plaintiffs were entitled to the return of all the
stock in their formerly owned family corporation. This corporation
had been acquired by the since bankrupt BarChris Corporation in
return for its stock. However, prior to this judgment, plaintiffs had
already reacquired their stock from BarChris' bankruptcy trustee.
Hence, the court's judgment only lent judicial sanction to the already
accomplished undoing of a corporate combination.
83 See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965).
84 See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
85 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated, 396
U.S. 875 (1970); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Lanza v. Drexel,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. R a,. 92,826 ($.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1970);
de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 834 (D. Colo. 1969); Berman v. Thomp-
son, 45 F.R.D. 342 (N.D. Ill. 1968), vacated, 312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. I1. 1970); Walpert
v. Bart, 280 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Md. 1967); Knauff v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 277 F.
Supp. 564 (D. Wyo. 1967); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Parker
v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 267 (D. Colo. 1965).
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In the Parker case, the court indicated a willingness to rescind
defendant's acquisition of a formerly totally owned subsidiary of a
debtor corporation in reorganization, as represented by plaintiff-
trustee, but only if and when plaintiff was able to plead and prove that
adequate restoration or a firm offer thereof had been made.
In Matheson v. Armbrust,." the Ninth Circuit granted rescission
of plaintiff's acquisition of a closely-held corporation, ordering the re-
turn to him of his full purchase price. Similarly, in Bowman & Bour-
don, Inc. v. Rohr,7 plaintiff, who had purchased all the stock in de-
fendants' closely-held corporation, allegedly on the basis of material
inaccuracies in its inventory figures, claimed violations of both the
1933 Act and rule lOb-5. Rescission of the entire transaction was
sought, requesting damages in the alternative. The court noted in
dictum that "[r]escission is a normal remedy in such cases and is ap-
propriate here."'s
Few Exchange Act cases actually focus on the wisdom of ordering
rescission of a corporate combination. Nevertheless, a number of fac-
tors a court is likely to consider in determining the appropriateness of
awarding rescission of a corporate combination to a successful lOb-5
plaintiff emerges from a reading of these cases and others decided at
common law.
(1) Laches
In Walpert v. Bart,"9 a shareholder sought to challenge his corpo-
ration's acquisition of a new subsidiary. Although the suit, brought
fifty days after consummation of the acquisition, was primarily dis-
missed for failure to state a claim under section 14 of the Exchange
Act, the court also pointed out some of the obstacles to effectuating
rescission, indicating that application of the doctrine of laches alone
would have precluded such an award:
[L]aches is appropriate here for two reasons. First, the plaintiff
should have at least let [it be known] . . . that he opposed the
merger and that he was having the proxy statement studied for its
legality. But even more important than that, he should have in-
formed [his corporation] . . . as soon as he planned to take legal
action rather than waiting until he took it.Y0
The Ninth Circuit in the Royal Air Properties case, also noted that the
86 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960).
87 296 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1969).
88 Id. at 852.
89 280 F. Supp. 1006 (). Md. 1967).
90 Id. at 1017.
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related defenses of waiver and estoppel, are available to the lOb-5 de-
fendant against whom equitable relief has been requested.
(2) Estoppel
Almost totally interrelated with the concept of laches is the doc-
trine of estoppel which may be applied to preclude an award of rescis-
sion when the request therefore is untimely and the defendant has so
changed his financial position during the delay that restoration of the
status quo ante would be impossible or unduly harsh. In the Walpert
case, indicating that plaintiff's delay in requesting rescission was alone
sufficient justification for denying such relief, the court explained that
[t]he plaintiff .. .has lulled third parties, who have purchased
the stock on the open market, into thinking that the action would
not be contested. Further he has allowed [his corporation] ...to
undertake a course of action that would be exceedingly difficult to
untangle.91
It is important to note that the court is concerned with the justifiable
reliance placed on plaintiff's temporary inaction by innocent third-
party transferees as well as with that shown by the corporate defendant.
Where the lOb-5 defendant has pumped considerable capital into a
corporate acquisition made pursuant to the challenged transaction, a
court, quite understandably, will be less willing to grant rescission.
(3) Waiver
Waiver of the right to elect to rescind may be found on the basis
of plaintiff's unreasonable delay in notifying defendant of his intent to
rescind or on the basis of plaintiff's filing suit for damages without, at
the same time, requesting rescission as an alternate (and perhaps pre-
ferred) form of relief. Where plaintiff is the acquiring party in a
challenged corporate combination, waiver may also be found on the
basis of conduct taken by it with respect to its new acquisition.
[a] Delay
The Royal Air Properties case vividly illustrates the fact that
courts are unlikely to be sympathetic to lOb-5 plaintiffs who delay the
bringing of suit until subsequent fluctuations in market value of the
securities sold or acquired dictates that a suit for rescission will yield a
greater recovery than a suit for out-of-pocket damages - "[s]ince the
buyer can elect to retain his investment, we see no reason why he can
not waive his statutory right to rescind .... ,,92
91 Id.
92 312 F.2d at 213.
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[b] Request for Monetary Relief
At least one court has indicated that an election by a 1Ob-5 plaintiff
to rescind is binding upon him, even though he subsequently desires
to affirm the challenged transaction because of an unanticipated fluctu-
ation in the value of the securities he has purchased or sold pursuant
thereto.93 The converse of this proposition might well be adopted by a
court in an appropriate case.
[c] Affirmation of Challenged Acquisition
The acquiring plaintiff in a challenged corporate acquisition,
even after announcing his intention to rescind, must be mindful of the
possibility that his continued operation of the acquired company pend-
ing the outcome of litigation may be interpreted as an affirmance or
ratification of the transaction.94 The law does not require a plaintiff
seeking rescission to refrain from continuing the normal operation of
its newly acquired corporate assets. Such action is often necessary to
preserve the assets to be returned to defendant pursuant to restoration
of the status quo ante9 5 Waiver of the right to rescind through affir-
mation of the challenged transaction will be found only on the basis
of actions performed that are "inconsistent with the claim of repudi-
ation,"96 such as the thorough integration of newly acquired corporate
assets into the plaintiff's former corporate structure.
(4) Mechanical Feasibility
Rescission is awarded only at the discretion of the trial court.
Often the primary consideration behind a court's refusal to grant
rescission is the fact that restoration of the status quo ante will be ex-
tremely difficult or impossible to effectuate.
A court of equity does, however, enjoy extreme flexibility in
fashioning a rescission. It may order partial rescission, restoration or
restitution in kind, or supervision of the carrying out of its decree by
a court-appointed master or referee. This flexibility is illustrated by
the Eighth Circuit's approach in Omaha Hardwood Lumber Co. v.
J. H. Phipps Lumber Co., 97 a non-Exchange Act suit brought to cancel
the sale of a manufacturing plant:
3 Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303
F.2d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1962).
94 See generally S. WILLISTON, CONTRACtS § 1527 (3d ed. 1970).
95 See generally 13 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud &" Deceit § 210 (1964).
96 Weigel v. Cook, 237 N.Y. 136, 140, 142 N.E. 444, 445 (1923); see also Wickre v.
Allen, 58 Wash. 2d 770, 364 P.2d 911 (1961); Bariel v. Tuinstra, 45 Wash. 2d 533, 276
P.2d 569 (1954).
97 135 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1943).
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The general principle that cancellation will not be granted unless
the other party can be placed in status quo must, of necessity, be
given a practical and somewhat flexible application to the circum-
stances of each particular case. The degree to which a literal re-
storation of the status quo will be required as a condition of can-
cellation depends largely upon the nature of the subject matter,
the circumstances of the transaction, the measure of the parties'
respective legal and moral responsibility for the confronting situa-
tion, and the equitableness of the judicial result that it is possible
to achieve. As it is commonly expressed, cancellation will be de-
nied if the granting thereof will leave the plaintiff with any un-
conscionable advantage, or if the defendant cannot be substantially
restored to his former position, under all the circumstances of the
case. . . . But, as with other equitable principles, the fundamental
test necessarily is whether, on the whole situation, justice in the
particular case will more nearly and practically be achieved by the
granting or by the denial of cancellation. 98
Nevertheless, despite manifesting this flexibility, courts have tra-
ditionally refused to award rescission where either plaintiff's restora-
tion or defendant's restitution is difficult to effectuate and an award of
compensatory damages will largely remedy the injury incurred. Let us
consider three possible obstacles to the effectuation of rescission of a
corporate combination tainted by a violation of rule lOb-5.
[a] Acquisition of Securities by Bona Fide Third-Party Purchaser
A bona fide purchaser of securities takes them free of adverse
claims.99 Where a corporate combination, as is often the case, is ac-
companied by a transfer of shares representing ownership of the corpo-
rate assets acquired or the consideration for same, and these shares are
subsequently sold to bona fide third-party purchaser, rescission of the
combination becomes impossible unless the court is willing to permit
restoration or restitution in kind. The latter possibility is likely to
arise only when shares paid as consideration for a corporate acquisition
are freely traded and available on a recognized stock exchange.
In the Gottlieb case, ex-shareholders of the World Wide Bowling
Corporation alleged that the company's acquisition by Sandia, accom-
plished through an exchange of stock and debentures, was induced by
material omissions and misrepresentations in violation of lOb-5. The
court, although fully cognizant of the fact that monetary relief would
not fully compensate plaintiffs, still ruled out the possibility of com-
plete rescission because of Sandia's subsequent transfer of its newly
98 Id. at 8.
99 N.Y. UzaFoam ComwacLAL CODE § 8-801(2).
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acquired World Wide stock, stating: "At the same time, a remedy of
strict rescission has been made impossible by the acts of the defendants
in spinning off and subsequently relinquishing their ownership inter-
est in the former World Wide assets . . .10o
A lOb-5 plaintiff desiring rescission of a corporate combination
pursuant to which the defendant has acquired transferable securities
should immediately move to temporarily enjoin the defendant's trans-
fer of these shares pending determination on the merits of his case. 10 1
[b] Integration of Acquired Corporate Assets
Rescission may become exceedingly difficult or even impossible to
effectuate once corporate assets acquired pursuant to a tainted trans-
action are merged with the other assets of the acquiring company.
Pointing to the inadvisability of awarding rescission in such circum-
stances, the court in Walpert noted that "[t]he plaintiff... [by refusing
to take prompt action] has allowed [his corporation] ... to undertake
a course of action that would be exceedingly difficult to untangle."'02
In May v. Midwest Refining Co.,1' 3 a non-Exchange Act case, the
First Circuit approved the district court's refusal to award rescission
in a suit brought by a former minority shareholder of a corporation
that had been dissolved after the sale of its assets to another corpora-
tion to challenge this acquisition, stating that
the District Court had power to decline to grant rescission .
and we see no reason to quarrel with the court below for exercising
that power under the somewhat peculiar circumstances of the case
at bar.
But that does not mean, as the plaintiff seems to argue, that
equitable relief is denied because of the proportionately small
number of shares which he owns. It means that the nature and
extent of the properties and assets sold by the Midwest Refining
Company to the defendants, and the commingling by the defen-
dants of those properties and assets with others either formerly
owned or later acquired by them, are proper elements for consid-
eration in determining whether or not it would be equitable to
rescind the sale.104
100 304 F. Supp. at 990.
101 See Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 304 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
see also Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953); N.Y.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-315(3) which provides that "[t]he right to obtain or re-
claim possession of a security may be specifically enforced and its transfer enjoined and
the security impounded pending the litigation."
102 280 F. Supp. at 1017.
103 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1942).
104 Id. at 438. In the course of its opinion, the court quoted the following language
of the trial court with approval:
With all interested parties in court, and the plaintiff making a complaint in-
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To prevent the "scrambling" of newly acquired corporate assets
by defendant, prompt action on the part of the plaintiff seeking rescis-
sion is necessary. Where the plaintiff is the acquiring party, he must
remain mindful that failure to segregate acquired assets will not only
render rescission mechanically difficult to effectuate but may also con-
stitute a waiver of his right to rescind.105
[c] Dissolution of Seller Corporation
Acquisition agreements often provide for dissolution of the corpo-
ration whose assets are to be transferred to the acquiring corporation.
Dissolution is generally accompanied by a pro rata distribution to the
acquired corporation's former shareholders of the consideration paid
by the acquiring corporation. The feasibility of effectuating rescission
against a recently dissolved corporation and its former shareholders
depends upon several important considerations.
(i) Suit Against Dissolved Corporation
A federal court will honor the right to bring suit against a dis-
solved corporation where this right is established by the law of the
incorporating state.1 6 Many states have such provisions. For example,
the Delaware Corporation Law provides:
All corporations, whether they expire by their own limitation
or are otherwise dissolved, shall nevertheless be continued for the
term of three years from such expiration or dissolution or for such
longer period as the Court of Chancery shall in its discretion
direct, bodies corporate for the purpose of prosecuting and defend-
ing suits, whether civil, criminal or administrative, by or against
them . . . 107
The section goes on to toll expiration of this three-year period upon
the commencement of suit by or against the dissolved corporation.
Once the right to bring timely suit against a dissolved corporation
volving the value of his holdings, which the defendants are willing to satisfy,
it does not seem reasonable to use such a difficult, clumsy and harsh method of
redress as that urged by the plaintiff, if any other can be found that is simple
and efficacious as well as just and equitable . . . and to attempt to grant relief
by annulling this sale made six years ago and restoring such a vast amount and
diversity of property as an oil company of this size must have owned, is wholly
impracticable. What counsel refers to as an "eighty million dollar egg" of that
character cannot be unscrambled and the expense and time involved in trying
to do so would be so great as to amount to a denial of justice.
Id. at 436-37.
105 See notes 94-96 and accompanying text supra.
106 See, e.g., United States v. P.F. Collier & Son, 208 F.2d 936, 937 (7th Cir. 1953)
(applying the Delaware statute); see also Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp.,
302 US. 120, 124-25 (1937).
107 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1967).
[Vol. 45:733
10b-5 REMEDIES
is established, additional obstacles must be met before rescission in the
aforedescribed type of lOb-5 suit may be effectuated.
(ii) Resurrection of Dissolved Corporation
Restoration by plaintiff of the assets acquired pursuant to the
challenged acquisition will require resurrection of the dissolved corpo-
ration. The power of a federal court, possessing full equity powers, to
resurrect a dissolved corporation for the purpose of effectuating rescis-
sion, while infrequently exercised, has long been recognized. In Jones
v. Missouri-Edison Co.,108 plaintiff, a former shareholder of a company
dissolved pursuant to the challenged, acquisition, sought recission there-
of. The court indicated that
[t]here is in the bill, it is true, a prayer that the agreement of con-
solidation be set aside, and that the property of the Edison Com-
pany be restored to it . . . . [T]he Edison Company was not so
irrevocably dissolved that its rehabilitation is beyond the power
of a court of chancery. Its dissolution was wrought by the transfer,
by means of the contract and act of consolidation, of its franchises,
powers and property to the new corporation. That transfer, that
act and that contract were voidable . . . . A court of equity has
plenary powers to set them all aside and to restore to the Edison
Company all its franchises, powers, and property, if action so dras-
tic becomes necessary in order to secure to them adequate relief.10
(iii) Compelling Restitution by Former Shareholders
The substantive basis for asserting a right to rescission against the
former shareholders of a dissolved corporation rests on a constructive
trust impressed upon the assets of the corporation that has been dis-
tributed to them. This constructive trust runs in favor of creditors of
and claimants against the dissolved corporation.110
Several cases indicate that in a suit requesting rescission of a trans-
action against a subsequently dissolved corporation, its former share-
holders are indispensable parties insofar as restitution will have to be
effectuated out of assets already distributed to them."' An argument
108 144 F. 765 (8th Cir. 1906).
109 Id. at 776-77.
110 See, e.g., Christian v. Texas Gas & Power Corp., 14 F.R.D. 80 (N.D. Tex. 1952)
(applying Delaware law); see also Hawkings V. Glenn, 131 U.S. 319 (1889).
111 Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1959); see also
Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corp., 880 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1967); Tucker v. National
Linen Serv. Corp., 200 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1953). A contrary argument may be made on
the basis of cases indicating that a judgment on the merits against a dissolved corpora-
tion may be enforced in a subsequent proceeding against its former shareholders. See,
e.g., Hancock Natl Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900) (judgment against dissolved
corporation in State X entitled to full faith and credit in State Y even though the share-
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can be made that in personam jurisdiction over former shareholders in
a lOb-5 suit may be based on section 27 of the Exchange Act which
provides for nationwide jurisdiction and service not only with respect
to all violations of the 1934 Act but also with respect to "actions...
brought to enforce any liability or duty created" by that Act.112
If, for any reason, in personam jurisdiction cannot be obtained
over certain former shareholders of the dissolved corporation, the pos-
sibility of obtaining in rem jurisdiction over them for purposes of
compelling restitution still exists. Section 57 of the Judicial Code
provides:
In an action in a district court to enforce any lien upon or
claim to, or to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the
title to, real or personal property within the district, where any
defendant cannot be served within the State, or does not volun-
tarily appear, the court may order the absent defendant to appear
or plead by a day certain. . . . If an absent defendant does not
appear or plead within the time allowed, the court may proceed
as if the absent defendant had been served with process within
the State, but any adjudication shall, as regards the absent defen-
dant without appearance, effect only the property which is the
subject of the action. When a part of the property is within an-
other district, but within the same state, such action may be brought
in either district.113
Various case authorities, when pieced together, support the propo-
sition that section 57 may be used in combination with a state provi-
sion fixing the situs of stock ownership for purposes of suit to obtain
in rem jurisdiction over former shareholders that must be joined in a
suit against the dissolved corporation for the purpose of effectuating
rescission. In Doherty v. McDowell,114 a suit brought in Maine some
fifty years ago by New York plaintiffs against Pennsylvania and Texas
defendants to quiet title to stock in a Maine corporation allegedly
acquired by them through fraud, the court, relying on Maine statutory
provisions, held that the locus of this stock, for purposes of suit under
section 57, was in Maine and refused to sustain a challenge to its in
rem jurisdiction over defendants. Despite the fact that there have been
holders were not parties to the State X action). As a practical matter, plaintiff will want
to join former shareholders in its suit against their dissolved corporation wherever pos-
sible, so as to avoid their transfer of distributed corporate assets to bona fide transferees
before judgment is obtained against the dissolved corporation.
112 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
113 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1964).
114 276 F. 728 (D. Me. 1921).
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holdings to the contrary,115 it was further held in Doherty that under
section 57, plaintiffs could sue to "establish a claim" to certain shares of
stock and that plaintiffs did not have to establish either title to or a
lien on this stock as a precondition to seeking to compel its return in a
suit pursuant to this provision.
CONCLUSION
The courts have yet to fully consider many questions concerning
the remedies available under rule lOb-5. Judicial treatment of almost
all questions falling under this broad rubric, including the more basic
ones that have arisen and been considered quite often, has been
marked by a surprising degree of flexibility. It is for these reasons that
the effective handling of even the relatively routine lob-5 case requires
both the skill and imagination of the artful litigator.
115 See, e.g., Maya Corp. v. Smith, 32 F.2d 850 (D. Del. 1929); see also Wilhelm v.
Consolidated Oil Corp., 84 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 196).
